Science: Perception and instability: Can there be a single description?


Abstract


Science has become the main standard of truth for contemporary societies. But what exactly is scientific knowledge? This article tries to answer the question by critiquing towards the description of science as a single universal model based on a distinctive method of obtaining knowledge. The text addresses the impossibility of defending the existence of an alleged scientific method, highlighting the complexity of scientific activity and its relationship to time-bound social and cultural aspects. Thus, we consider the importance of understanding how scientific knowledge is constructed and legitimised with a number of connections and interactions of various elements that provide a historical form to what we understand by science.


Keywords


science; scientific method; scientific knowledge

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