Las representaciones conceptuales en la ciencia cognitiva


Resumen: En el marco de la ciencia cognitiva se ha polemizado acerca de la manera en la que el enfoque enraizado de la cognición pueda compatibilizarse con al enfoque clásico con el fin de explicar nuestras capacidades conceptuales. Sin embargo este debate metodológico no ha sido acompañado de una elucidación de la noción de “representación conceptual” tal como venía siendo entendida al menos en la filosofía y psicología cognitivas. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar en que consiste una representación conceptual con el fin de aportar claridad al debate sobre las capacidades conceptuales enraizadas. Desarrollaré y evaluaré la idea de que una representación es conceptual si puede combinarse sistemáticamente para formar nuevas estructuras representacionales y si se puede utilizar en tareas psicológicas con independencia del estímulo.

Abstract: In cognitive science, it is an open debate whether grounded cognition might be compatible with traditional views of cognition. However, as far as I am aware, this methodological debate has not been accompanied by an elucidation of the notion of “conceptual representation” as it has been understood in philosophy and cognitive psychology. The aim of this paper is to offer an elucidation of this sort. I will develop and evaluate the idea that a representation is conceptual when it can be systematically combined to form new representational structures and when it can be used in psychological tasks regardless of the stimulus.

Palabras clave: capacidades conceptuales, sistematicidad, independencia del estímulo, cognición enraizada, psicología cognitiva.

Keywords: conceptual abilities, sistematicity, independence of stimulus, grounded cognition, cognitive psychology.

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