¿Qué es una emoción?


Resumen


Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es realizar un repaso de las teorías de las emociones más importantes de las últimas décadas y valorar en qué medida tales teorías ofrecen una buena caracterización del fenómeno en cuestión. Para alcanzar una comprensión adecuada de las diferentes teorías, así como del rumbo que ha tomado el debate actual sobre las emociones, es importante que prestemos especial atención a algunos de los compromisos filosóficos involucrados en la formulación de estas teorías. La revisión cuidadosa de algunos de estos compromisos nos llevará a plantearnos si algunas de las dificultades a las que se enfrentan varias de las teorías de las emociones actuales podrían tener origen en tales compromisos filosóficos y no, como suele pensarse, en la complejidad de las emociones.


Abstract: The aim of this paper is to review the most important theories of emotions in recent decades and to assess the extent to which these theories provide a good characterisation of the phenomenon in question. In order to achieve an appropriate understanding of the different theories, as well as of the direction that the current debate on emotions has taken, it is important that we pay special attention to some of the philosophical commitments involved in the formulation of these theories. Careful examination of some of these commitments will lead us to consider whether some of the difficulties faced by several of the current theories of emotions might stem from such philosophical commitments rather than, as is often thought, from the complexity of emotions.


Palabras clave: episodios, intencionalidad, fenomenología, propiedades evaluativas.


Keywords: episodes, intentionality, phenomenology, evaluative properties.


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Referencias


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 Licencia de Creative Commons

Esta obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional.