“The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism”


Resumen


This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.


Texto completo:

PDF

Enlaces refback

  • No hay ningún enlace refback.


Indexada en 

ERIH

 

 

 

 

 

   

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.......................................................................................................

http://ojs.uv.es/public/site/images/peteruiz/sekle_120

Revista de Estudios Kantianos. Publicación internacional de la SEKLE

 

Resultado de imagen de departament de filosofia universitat valencia logo