

POLITICS TALK SHOWS IN TWITTER: A NEUROCOMMUNICATIVE MODEL OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS¹

Beatriz Gallardo Paúls

University of Valencia

Beatriz.Gallardo@uv.es

Abstract

In this paper we apply a model of political and media discourse analysis developed in previous publications to the social network Twitter. The model aims to reconcile the study of discourse data with explanatory proposals about political communication (neurocommunication, neuropolitics) and digital communication (Internet as fifth state, convergence, collective intelligence). We assume that there are categories of discursive frame that can be treated as indicators of cognitive and communicative skills. These categories are analysed and grouped in three main dimensions: intentional (illocutional force of the tweet, interpretive frame of the hashtags), referential (topics, agents), and interactive (structural predictability and alignment, intertextuality and dialogism markers, and partisan affiliation). The corpus consists of 4,116 tweets: 3,000 tweets belonging to the TV programs *Al Rojo Vivo*, *Las Mañanas de Cuatro* y *Los Desayunos de TVE*, and 1,116 tweets of followers of the programs, 45 tweets correspond to each program. The results confirm that the model allows identifying different profiles of political subjectivity in the Twitter accounts.

KEY WORDS: political discourse, digital speech, Twitter

1. A model of discourse analysis

In this paper we apply to the social network Twitter a discourse analysis model proposed by Enguix and Gallardo (2015), which aims to be compatible with the peculiarities of digital communication and with the neurocommunicative paradigm. Our starting point is the pragmatic conception of the discursive frame, understanding it as a

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notion that the issuing subject manifests not only in the lexical selection, but in all the dimensions of the communicative act (Gallardo, 2013, 2014; Gallardo and Enguix, 2014, 2016).

1.2. Communication on the Internet

The means of communication described for the digital society require theoretical models adjusted to a type of communicative actions where “you do not try to inform or convince but only to occupy public space, get the sale or the vote at any price” (Timoteo, 2007). If this is so, and the Internet user has that almost exhibitionist will, we could venture that the discourse of the network is, fundamentally, a monological and self-centred, egocentric discourse, that dispenses with the recipient. That is why Ramonet (2015) talks about the change from a “medium-centric” system to a “me-centric” system.

And yet, social networks offer an open communicative framework that seems to privilege dialogue and interaction, fostering citizen/voter participation in the public sphere of communication. In other words:

“la información ya no circula como antes, en unidades precisas, controladas, bien corregidas y calibradas [...] Convertida en algo inmaterial, ahora toma la forma de un fluido que circula en ‘segmentos abiertos’ por la Red casi a la velocidad de la luz. Las redes sociales y la Web permiten a los ‘web-actores’ completar cada noticia añadiendo un matiz, un comentario, una cita, una foto o un vídeo, en lo que podría llamarse un trabajo de inteligencia colectiva” [Ramonet, 2015].

From the critical analysis of discourse, Van Dijk (2009: 123) has insisted that access to discourse is an essential element for the discursive reproduction of power. This access is doubly understood, both by reference to the possibilities of being the subject of discourse, and by reference to the possibilities of being a user of the discourse (sender/receiver). In this sense, we can say that social networks have meant a radical change in the access of the average citizen to the public and political sphere, as well as in the expansion of that same sphere, which no longer depends on the channels opened by the media and the institutions, but it is deployed in the infinite space of the Internet, without limits of space or time of emission (Gallardo and Enguix, 2016: 131). These communicative flows place the information in a continuous imperfective aspect, lacking in ending, which apparently equates the “prosumer” (producer/consumer) with the information professional; it is generally assumed that the Internet, and more specifically social networks, alters the public sphere (Shirky, 2011), which has a special impact in the realm of political (and journalistic) reality.

There are already several theories that try to focus these discursive processes of the digital world from global approaches, among which we are especially interested in the proposal of William Dutton (2009), who considers the Internet as a Fifth Estate:²

“with some characteristics similar o the Fourth Estate, but sufficiently distinctive and important features to warrant its recognition as a new Fifth Estate. This is being built on the growing use of the Internet and related information and communication technologies[ICTs] in ways that are enabling ‘networked individuals’ to reconfigure access to alternative sources of information, people and other resources” [Dutton, 2009: 3].

This Fifth Estate, which would refer to Castells *network society*, is characterised by increasing the communicative power of citizens, and reconfiguring their access to information. Something that in turn links with another notion well developed since the 1990s, which is what considers the Internet as the framework for the development of collective intelligence (Lévy, 1997; Timoteo, 2014).

1.3. Neurocommunication and neuropolitics

Neurocommunication has been proposed as a new paradigm in communication studies, which applies the advances and discoveries of neuroscience to communicative processes. According to Uña et al. (2014: 132), neurocommunication allows to study how sensory information is processed, and to apply this knowledge both to the creation of electoral and advertising messages and to the design of strategies to capture the attention of the electorate and achieve high levels of impact and memory. Along the same lines, some authors propose identifying a specific area of knowledge for *neuropolitics*, conceived as a discipline that investigates the biological (brain) bases of the (mental) reactions that citizens-voters have when they are exposed to the stimuli of the political communication (Rubio and Sapag, 2014: 187-188).

This interest in neurology in the field of communication studies is not an isolated phenomenon. The last decade has been rich in theoretical proposals of supposed neuroscientific foundation, due, no doubt, to the consolidation of two well-known scientific investment initiatives: the “Decade of the brain” of the Bush administration in the United States (1990-1999), and the “Human Brain” project of the European Union (2013). Thus, claiming a not always proven theoretical coherence with the functioning of brain structures and neural networks, we witness the emergence of other so-called subdisciplines such as neuropedagogy, neuroeconomics or neuromarketing... there are even those who speak of neurohappiness.

² The idea already appears in a text by Turner, Bonner and Marshall (2000) on the construction of fame: “The ‘Fourth Estate’ is in danger of being overwhelmed by the ‘Fifth Estate’, the growing number of ‘PR merchants and spin doctors’ influencing the news agenda” (apud. Bruns, 2033: 1).

In the specific case of neuropolitics, there are several experimental proposals that have been developed since the 1970s. Typical cases use neuroimaging to investigate the changes experienced by a person's brain when viewing images of political representatives, seeking variations between those candidates with whom you identify and those whom you politically reject. Since the 1980s there are studies that investigate possible relationships between behaviours and political attitudes and brain functioning, especially from implicit association experiments. For example, subjects are proposed to associate names and faces of well-known politicians with positive and negative evaluations, and prefrontal neuronal activation patterns are analysed according to these associations. Other studies, on the other hand, aim to identify structural (anatomical) differences in subjects with different political orientation (Sperry et al., 1979, Kanai et al., 2011).

More recently, studies on neurology and politics have taken as a basis the system of mirror neurons identified by Gallese and Rizzolatti in 1991. The characteristic feature of these neurons is that they are activated in individuals both when they perform a certain action and when they observe someone else doing it. This specular dimension of reciprocity has made it possible to consider that mirror neurons are one of the neurophysiological mechanisms from which language and communication emerge, as well as the emotional empathy that is at the basis of political identification (Lakoff, 2004: 44; Timothy, 2014: 53).

However, a careful analysis of research on neurology and political communicative attitudes reveals a certain lack of definition. To say that political attitudes and decisions have some kind of neurological manifestation is, quite simply, a truism, since all the cognitive activity of the human being, as well as the associated executive functions (memory, attention, planning, or self-observation), have neurological footprint (Knutson et al., 2006). Another thing is to try to identify fixed correlates between brain areas / structures and political attitudes / decisions, since both are extremely complex. Sometimes studies assume simplifications (to talk, for example, of “conservative brains” and “progressive brains”) that can lead to serious deterministic prejudices, in addition to being little operational.

Without intention of exhaustiveness, we can say that the studies that try to establish correlations between neurology and politics show some fundamental epistemological problems that we refer to very briefly below:

- **Mind-brain isomorphism.** Cognitive neuropsychology has claimed as one of its premises what is often called *mind-brain isomorphism*: it is accepted that the cognitive modules that perform different mental activities have a physical support in neurons and specific neuronal circuits. Many works on neuropolitics assume a reductionist vision of this theoretical isomorphism, and confuse the description of biological bases with the cognitive processes that support them, which is why we often speak of “brains” when “minds” are described.

- **Uncertainty in the research objectives.** The different experiments show different conceptions of what can be investigated. It is one thing³ to analyse the biological basis of the relevant mental processes in political experience (brain activity), and another one to look for fixed and stable correlates between brain structures and that same political experience (neuroanatomy). Aguirre (2008) has pointed out that these studies are frequently based on reductionisms that constitute true “neuromyths”.⁴
- **To treat politics as a differentiated mental reality.** Nor is it clear what is the specificity of the cognitive processing characteristic of political experience; it seems that sometimes the type of cognitive activity experienced by the subject (identification, approval, rejection, fear) is confused with the type of content or referents that provoke such activity (one political option or another). It is not the same to say that large brain areas of the frontal lobe are involved in decision making, than to claim the same activation exclusively for decisions of a political nature (Knutson et al., 2006). Could we accept, for example, that replicating the same experiments replacing politicians with soccer players would allow us to talk about “neurofootball”?
- **Heterogeneity in the conception of politics.** Fourth, and as a prerequisite, not only should extreme rigor be applied when using neurological concepts, but also in the political concepts that are evaluated; it would be necessary to establish very well which are the parameters with which conservatism and progressivism are defined, which cannot depend only on the self-concept expressed by each

³ It does not have the same relevance to say, for example, that individuals who describe themselves as liberals show a greater volume of gray matter in the anterior cingulate cortex, and that those who declare more conservatism present greater volume of the right amygdala (Kanai et al., 2011: 677), than to indicate that individuals show greater activation of the bilateral amygdala when they observe the image of the candidate they are going to vote for than when they observe the candidates of the rest of the parties (Rule et al., 2010).

⁴ These “neuromyths” have a certain cultural justification, and are related to the prestige of neuroscience, also fuelled by the media attention. For example, in the context of the autonomous and municipal elections of 2015, *El Mundo* commissioned Sigma Dos a study on neuropolitics that was concretised in an experiment on value associations based on images of politicians. The article “La primera ‘neuroencuesta’ en España”, published in *El Mundo* on May 3, 2015 by Teresa Guerrero, dealt with an experiment with 20 adults of different political options, that combined two types of analysis: 1) the electroencephalography and eye tracking values obtained from the images of the main election candidates; and 2) the 1-10 assessment on a Lickert scale, on the attributes of ability, credibility, closeness, honesty and leadership in the same politicians. What was not mentioned in the report, and is the key to defend the neurocommunicative validity of the study, is how the correlation between the graph of the encephalogram or the saccades studied in the visual test is established, and the numerical range of 1 to 10 expressed in the verbal test, that is, how the results of the neurological observation are “translated”. On the other hand (Gallardo, 2016), the informative video published with the news shows that the images presented by the different politicians are absolutely heterogeneous (for example, in the body posture the image of Pablo Iglesias is exceptional with his arms folded in foreshortening while all the others appear with cuts of face and neck, also in the use of colour highlights the red background of the photo of Cayo Lara against the clear backgrounds of others, etc.). Cf. <http://www.elmundo.es/ciencia/2015/05/03/55439281e2704e56458b4578.html>

subject at the time of an experiment. In addition (Lakoff, 2008: 9, Kanai et al., 2011: 677), the political stance of a citizen cannot be considered a monolithic and constant construct, although experiments based on self-description assume that identity as something stable and predictor of the vote.

These four factors advise consolidating the neurocommunicative approach based on its cognitive anchorage, and not strictly neurological aspects. From our point of view, the interest lies not so much in the brain and its extremely complex network of connections and specialised areas as in the cognitive processes that are activated in the political experience of each person, conditioned by their previous experiences, by their biography, and by rational and emotional associations. And from this approach we see that political discourse can become an indicator of neurocommunicative abilities. Therefore, to give a neurocommunicative foundation to a discourse analysis model, we will establish correlations between neurological elements (the network of mirror neurons), cognitive abilities (intersubjective capacity) and discursive features.

Mirror neurons have been proposed as a biological support for cognitive skills such as empathy and communication; but among the many skills that have been associated with mirror neurons, there is a specific psychological concept that is a particular concern to us: the Theory of Mind, ToM (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). This theory was proposed in primatology in the late 1970s to refer to the ability to confer beliefs, feelings and intentions to other subjects: when a chimpanzee demonstrates in his or her behaviour that he or she is capable of understanding what another chimpanzee wants, feels or believes, it is said that “he or she has theory of mind”, or “intersubjective capacity”; since the beginning of the 1980s, this line of research has expanded and began to characterise certain neurological disorders (especially autistic spectrum) as a “deficit of theory of mind”. In the discursive field, the existence of ToM can be verified through comprehension tests (tasks of “false belief”), but also by looking for expressive marks of subjectivity based on qualitative analysis such as the one we present for our corpus.

Taking into account these formal marks, and starting from the boot dialogic scheme that differentiates between initiative and reactive tweets / turns, we will analyse in each tweet categories referring to three significant dimensions: what action is carried out (intentional dimension), what is spoken of (referential dimension), and, given the nature of our corpus, from what political alignment (interactive dimension).




TABLE 1: Theoretical correlates

We can identify some linguistic categories as indicators of intersubjective capacity, that is, as their verbal correlate. In particular, the formal traces of the enunciation used by the speaker to introduce their subjectivity into messages (Benveniste, 1958), and the predictability categories derived from the principle of cooperation (Grice, 1975), which allow the speaker to imply in the message the recipients through link elements with other people's turns, can be interpreted as specific linguistic marks of intersubjectivity, that is, of interaction and dialogue. The subject with theory of the mind assumes that his interlocutor is, like himself, a communicative and intentional subject, and leaves traces of this double premise in his messages.

From a discursive point of view, Twitter messages can be adjusted to the dialogue structure, which in our case corresponds to initiatory, trigger, tweets, in the programs accounts (D corpus) and reactive tweets in the followers (R corpus).⁵ While the broadcast of supposedly informative messages defines the accounts managed by the television programs, the individual user who identifies himself/herself as “follower” has similar access to the reactive and initiatory use (although our corpus is limited to the reactive one). Therefore, Twitter offers the user a scenario of anonymous consumption but also of active participation, converting the initiating messages issued by the media in turn-triggers, worthy of response or explicit and public comment. From this pragmatic possibility, the myth of social networks is born as a source of socialisation, participation and social mobilisation, a phenomenon frequently mentioned in relation to recent events such as 15M, the Arab Spring, or the Valencian Spring, but which can especially be seen from electoral campaigns in 2008 and 2010 (Castells, 2014; Ampofo et al., 2011, Gallardo and Enguix, 2016).

⁵ It should be noted that the comments are characterised by a formal oversight that highlights the worst features of writing on the Internet; very few use punctuation, misspellings are frequent, and there are cases that simply do not make sense; other times it is possible to detect errors of the automatic writing function that is frequently used in mobile devices. All these details are beyond our interest.

The sender accounts of the programs, on the other hand, also have access to the reactive tweets and in theory could respond to those of their followers, but the closest manifestation to reactive shifts is limited to the use of the retweet, which is only occasionally used by *Las Mañanas Cuatro* (LMC) and *Los Desayunos de TVE* (DTVE) (respectively, 16.9% and 10.7% of their tweets). Therefore, in the accounts of the programs, an initiatory-vertical use predominates, from which the followers write their comments and occasionally establish among them brief exchanges of reactive-horizontal tweets.

1.4. Discursive correlates of neurocommunication

The elements that we have described allow to identify a series of discursive categories that are interpretable as indicators of political subjectivity and that also have a specific reflection in the use of Twitter.

Enunciative pragmatics: intentionality	
Ilocutivity	Type of action performed by each tweet
Interpretive keys	Hashtags #
Textual pragmatics: referentiality	
Predicative dimension	Protagonists of the tweet
Propositional dimension	Topic / Issue
Interactive pragmatics: alignment and affiliation	
Predictability and alignment	Mentions @ Second person marks Trigger syntax
Intertextuality	Retweets Literal quotations Links
Political affiliation	Partisan opinion

TABLE 2: Discursive indicators of political subjectivity on Twitter

Assuming the usual distinction of three pragmatic levels, we propose an analysis of the corpus tweets according to the scheme of table 2, which we developed in § 3.

1.5. Methodologies to study Twitter

The development of studies on Twitter’s communicative model shows a rate of growth almost as fast as that of the platform itself. In this area, it is worthwhile to dwell on the methodological proposals for their analysis, since the corpus selection procedures in each investigation are fundamental (as in any study) for the transferability of their conclusions.

From research areas in computer science and data mining, research based on computer analysis of large tweets corpora have been developed. Possibly one of the first studies of this type is that of Kwak et al. (2010), which involved an exhaustive attempt to describe, at that time, 106 million tweets belonging to 41.7 million user profiles; this pioneer

work already indicated as a defining factor of Twitter a low reciprocity that was noticeably far from the usual characteristics in human social networks (2010: 591).

There are several possibilities for exporting messages, and some of the work we review involves designing specific applications. Twitter offers two relevant API (Application Programming Interface) components, one retroactive and another projective: the search tool allows you to retrieve previous tweets that match the proposed criteria, and streaming allows you to subscribe to a continuous stream of new tweets with those same criteria. From these tools, there are many applications that allow you to obtain compact corpora, such as yourTwrapperkeeper (yTK) that generates files in MySQL format, or TwDocs, which generates Excel files (Bruns and Burgess, 2012: 805). Most often, corpora are designed by searching for certain labels; for example, Conover et al. (2011) design a corpus of political tweets based solely on the existence of a political label, arguing that:

“politically-motivated individuals often annotate content with hashtags whose primary audience would not likely choose to see such information ahead of time, a phenomenon known as content injection” [Conover et al., 2011: 194].

Bruns and Stieglitz review the limitations of these applications for the validity of the corpus and conclude (2013: 93) that samples of tweets exported with this type of applications inevitably include a margin of error and that their representativeness is not exhaustive. These same authors (2012) show the relevance of the contextual and thematic aspects for the use of the communicative tools offered by the platform, and propose an inventory of communicative practices apparently well established in the social network. Its corpus, of about 6 million tweets obtained from 40 hashtags, uses a search procedure for tags and keywords. Users are classified into three activity groups with the formula 1/9/90, which means that 1% of the corpus belongs to the most active users, 9% to high activity users and the remaining 90% to users of low activity.

For the corpus identified from labels, they design an inventory of measures to systematise the quantitative analysis of the tweets:

1. User activity measures: the number of unique users that contribute to the set of tweets of the same tag. There are three levels of use: those of maximum, average and low contribution.
2. Tweet-type measures: the percentages of original tweets for each tag (ie, initiating messages: without mentions, retweets, or responses to other users), of genuine responses for each tag (ie, reactive messages), of retweets, and messages with embedded hyperlink. At this point Bruns and Stieglitz (2012: 174) recognise the limitation of obtaining the corpus from labels. Our corpus reflects, indeed, that the response tweets issued by the followers of the programs hardly include the hashtags.

The same authors develop their quantification proposal in a later article (Bruns and Stieglitz, 2013), limiting it to “tagged conversations”, for which they propose three basic types of indicators:⁶

1. Indicators that examine the total activity and visibility of each user (initiating tweets, retweets, mentions, answers).
2. Indicators that establish the temporal flow of the conversation, and of specific forms of conversation (tweet ratios by time measurements).
3. Indicators that combine the measures of time and user to examine the contributions of specific groups of users, more or less active during each unit of time.

Designing the corpora with these indicators (@, #, RT, URL) gives objectivity to the data, and facilitates the comparison and computerised handling of large samples, but as D’heer and Verdegem (2015) point out it can mean a technological bias, since those tweets from a conversation that do not have the label are eliminated. Marres (2013), for her part, indicates that if a user uses a certain label, but does not follow the other users who also use it (for example, all the followers of the program proposed by the hashtag), he can not perceive that supposed feeling of community and belonging.

On the other hand, Mancera and Pano (2013), and Pano and Mancera (2014), from more linguistic and qualitative approaches (which therefore require more limited data samples), make an interesting proposal of analysis of political tweets, centered above all on the constructional units of the tweets; their approach allows them to establish associations between the structure of the message, its level of interactivity and its possible ideological alignment, both elements of interest for our approach.

The approach presented in this paper is based on the fundamental categories of discourse analysis, which will allow us to account for 1) the intentionality of the issuers, 2) the topics and issues to which visibility is given, and the actors to which the protagonism of the political action is given, and 3) the elements of ideological alignment and partisan affiliation.

2. The data of this work

2.1. Two data corpora

The study we present is based on two corpora. The first (Corpus D, trigger) is made up of tweets belonging to the accounts of three information / political talk shows; the second one (Corpus R, reactive) is formed by the responses of the followers to a

⁶ Together with these, additional indicators are proposed such as language, geolocation, use of hyperlinks, or external data extracted from user profiles.

selection of 135 of those tweets (45 of each program). Therefore, they are not labeled corpora (Bruns and Stieglitz, 2013: 94), since our interest did not point to the specific treatment of a specific topic on the network, but to how political subjectivity is built in the social network.

Corpus D is formed of a total of 3,000 tweets belonging to the three selected programs: on the one hand Al Rojo Vivo (ARV) and Las Mañanas de Cuatro (LMC), which are broadcast simultaneously on the two private channels La Sexta and Cuatro, and on the other side Los Desayunos de TVE (DTVE), broadcast in the morning (from 8:30 a.m. to 10:05 a.m.) on the first channel of the Spanish public broadcaster Radiotelevisión Española. For the elaboration of the sample, an automatic export was made on January 20, 2015, through the TwDocs application, of the last 1,000 tweets of each of the accounts, which gave us a final file of 3,000 items. In addition to these automatically obtained data, for each tweet the number of responses from twitter users was manually counted. The following table reflects average values of the tweets of the three accounts, including retweets, marks as favourite, and responses generated by each message.

	ARV	DTVE	M4
Antiquity	12.02.2011	04.09.2012	08.09.2011
Home corpus	05.12.2014	24.10.2014	12.12.2014
End corpus	20.01.2015	20.01.2015	20.01.2015
Programmes	27	51	25
Tweets / Programme	37	19,6	38,5
RT average	14,3	4,3	37
FV average	6,1	1,1	12,9
Answers average	7,6	2,4	10,7

TABLE 3: Corpus D of initiatory tweets

From this initial corpus, a Corpus R, of answers, was manually selected with the comments that appear in the dropdown of each tweet. For each program 3 selections of 15 tweets were chosen from January 20, December 30 and December 12, dates that correspond to the initial, final and middle days of the LMC corpus, the shortest one temporarily. The following table shows the total amount of 1,116 reactive tweets belonging to the followers of the programmes. As can be seen, the DTVE programme shows much less activity, both triggering and reactive, while LMC is the one that gets more participation from its followers.

	Usual hours
ARV	Monday to Friday, from 12:15 pm to 14:00 pm
DTVE	Monday to Friday, from 08:30 am to 10:05 am
LMC	Monday to Friday, from 12:20 pm to 14:00 am

TABLE 4: Corpus R of answer tweets

The final result is a sample of 3,000 initiatory tweets, generated by the three television programmes, and 20,760 reactive tweets, written by the spectators / followers, of which a total of 1,116 are qualitatively analysed. By revisiting the network at later moments to the design of the corpus, two features are observed in the users' tweets:

- Some have modified their alias and profile picture (although not their identification account).
- Some have been deleted, which sometimes affects other response or comment tweets.

2.2. The accounts of the three programmes

The program *Al Rojo Vivo* is broadcast on the television network *La Sexta*; its Twitter account was created on January 12, 2011, and at the time of obtaining the corpus he had 147,784 followers and 11,800 tweets. The oldest tweet is from December 5, 2014, which provides a global period of 47 days that, if we eliminate the days in which there was no programme, is specified in a total of 30 days, with an average of 33.3 daily tweets.

The programme *Las Mañanas Cuatro* is broadcast on the television network *Cuatro*; its Twitter account was created on September 8, 2011, and at the time of obtaining the corpus it had 50,196 followers and 19,888 tweets. The oldest tweet is December 12, 2014, which means a total period of 40 total days reduced to 26 programmes eliminating the days without issuance with an average of 38.5 tweets per program.

The programme *Los Desayunos de TVE* is broadcast on the public *TVE-1* network; its Twitter account was opened on September 4, 2012, and at the time of obtaining the corpus it had 11,112 followers and 9,621 tweets; the period of 1,000 tweets extends from January 20 to October 24, 2014, that is, a total of 89 days in which 51 programs are broadcast, with an average of 19.6 tweets per programme. The use of this account is the most irregular one, and in fact there are days when the programme only publishes one or two tweets announcing the guests of the day, but without further messages; other days, the account only publishes retweets

of María Casado, the presenter, also announcing the guests of the next day.

As regards the frequency of use and the degree of response obtained by the tweeted community, the most balanced comparison is that involving the two programs of the private channels, broadcast at the same time. We see that *LMC* is undoubtedly the most active program on Twitter, your account is the oldest and most tweets published by program. These tweets have an average of 10.7 comments from followers, an average of 37 retweets and 12.9 brands as favorites. *ARV* is a little less active, with a ratio of 33.3 messages per program, and an average of 7.5 comments. However, the *La Sexta* program has more than double the number of followers, which possibly explains its greater number of comments; however, retweets and favorites are smaller than in *LMC*.

The programme that publishes fewer tweets is that of the public network, whose broadcasting time is on the first fringe of the morning; the average number of comments is 2.5 tweets per initiatory tweet. LMC and DTVE also coincide in the use of the retuit (their two drivers, unlike ARV, have a personal account that often serves as feedback) and in the frequency of meta-informative tweets, which warn the viewer about the contents of the program, about the moment of beginning and end, on the recommended hashtag ...

- 1) Los Desayunos @Desayunos_tve: En la tertulia, hoy, @NativelPreciado @tiempodehoy, @bitorubido @ABC_es y @Perez_go @COPE_es #Desayunos TVE @La1_tve @24h_tve

This type of tweets is less frequent in ARV. As for the structure of the messages, the prototypical ARV tweet is an informative message that includes a link to the specific video that is broadcast in the programme; in a high proportion, that information includes literal quotations of fragments of the video in question. These links are not permanent, so that at the time of the analysis they refer mostly to the general website of the program and, to a lesser extent, to short texts about the news in question, sometimes with a photograph. The text structure written accompanying a screenshot of the program at the time of the tweet, is the prototypical structure of the tweets published by LMC. Frequently, the tweets in this program include a second link that redirects to a news item that is minimally written on the program's website; and when the tweet includes video with fragments of the program, it is usually kept active. In addition, sometimes LMC extends the tweets with journalistic information after the end of the programme.

We see, then, that the two programs of the private channels conceive the use of twitter differently: in ARV it seems to be a use directed to the followers who are not watching the television programme and only follow it via Internet: they link them to fragments of the issue that are no longer active after the program. On the contrary, the use of CML is less perishable; is entertained in taking a screenshot and in writing a short text for a large part of the tweets, and the links are still active.

3. Application of the model

3.1. The illocutionary dimension of the tweet: categories related to intention

The starting point in all textual analysis of pragmatic basis is, undoubtedly, the communicative action. According to the classic statement of Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980), according to which “*dire, c’est en même temps faire*”, we consider the action intended by the issuer, his or her communicative intention. And in an analysis of tweets linked to politics and the public sphere, that intention is inevitably loaded with ideology:

“Certain arguments, discourse fragments, and topoi are understood very differently in different historical periods and socio-political contexts. Ideologies are therefore

not to be equated with one or more quasi static discourses, but with intended or not intended meanings, with illocutionary and perlocutionary forces” [Wodak, 2007: 2].

The ideology appears, indeed, in the linguistic fact, and it is possible to trace it from the study of more or less subtle expressive mechanisms, assuming the discourse (Salvador, 2012: 15) as a social practice that coexists and is related to other social practices of agentive and action nature. Hence, our starting point is precisely that which addresses the agentive dimension of the discursive fact.

3.1.1. Illocutivity

The concept of illocutivity, proposed by John Austin in the 1950s and specially developed by John Searle in the 1970s, points to the action that the speaker performs simultaneously with its emission. It is, in short, what is the communicative intention that governs the speaker in his or her speech: do you want to propose, convince, insult, comment, defend, attack? It is obvious that these actions reveal in themselves a certain mentalist conception regarding the interlocutor, so the study of illocutivity / intentionality must be relevant as an indicator of the existence of theory of mind.

In other works we have raised (Gallardo, 2013, 2014; Gallardo and Enguix, 2014) if the political discourse prototypically privileges any of these actions, finding differences between the political discourse of the parties and their representatives, and the political discourse of the media. Thus, and against what might be expected, both parties and politicians privilege a communication that is fundamentally expressive, of attack on the opponent and self-praise; this speech implicitly points to directive acts (“vote me!”), and is complemented by representative acts that apparently unfold the proposals on political action and subsequent argumentation. On the other hand, the political discourse of the media means the absolute deployment of representative acts, while the expressive acts appear much less and are almost exclusively limited to the genres of opinion; this, obviously, does not imply a representative neutrality,⁷ but rather the ideological bias depends on other mechanisms, such as the selection of issues and source-emitters, the type and intensity of coverage of each theme, etc.

In short, we begin the analysis by posing the intentional framing of each tweet, the communicative action it performs. The corpus offers us samples of two types of issuers: the media (three infotainment programs), and citizens who follow those same programs; The voice of politicians, as we shall see, also appears in the corpus, embedded in the quotation mechanism.

Given the different nature of the two types of issuers, we can expect differences in their communicative action: the basic types of speech act expected in corpus D are those of information, but we will see that also expressive tweets of valuation appear, almost

⁷ Recall the definition of Searle (1976: 10): all representative acts “are assessable on the dimension of assessment which include ‘true’ and ‘false’”.

always articulated by quotation and / or inference mechanisms through tagging. In corpus R the most expected are the representative acts of commentary and expressive acts of assessment.

3.1.1.1. *Illocutivity in corpus D*

D messages, belonging to the accounts of the television programs, have an interactive initiative orientation, which opens the communication. The exception is the few retweet examples, in which we highlight two basic uses:

- A message of accounts referring to programme ratings is retweeted.
- An informative message issued by another means of communication is retweeted. The circular functioning of the media and the traditional feedback between, for example, the written press and television are well known; the already classic concept of Bourdieu (1996: 30) of circular circulation of information, has consequences of thematic and discursive homogeneity, media amplification and self-reference. Probably Twitter (in general, the virality of the network) can be understood as a magnification of this media self-reference, which in turn is related to the reprofessionalisation of the political journalist (Enguix, 2015).

As regards the intentionality of each message (Table 5), the trigger tweets show four fundamental types of illocutivity: 1) meta-informative tweets, 2) directive tweets, 3) information or comment tweets, and 4) statement tweets, among which we differentiate those who give the voice to a protagonist of the current news, and those who give voice to one of the guests in the programme.

ILLOCUTIVITY	ARC
Directive	1
Representative: metainformative	51
Representative: quote protagonist	474
Representative: quote commentator	295
Representative: information / comment	179
TOTAL	1000

TABLE 5: *Intencionality in the tweets of the three programmes.*

As you can see, *directive tweets*, which appeal directly to the recipient and transfer some type of action, are the minimum ones. The apparent exception of the DTVE program corresponds to a daily retweet message from María Casado’s account, which asks users to send a photograph of the sunrise. A specific variant of these direct allusions to the audience is that which directly asks a certain opinion, offering the citizen two options that are identified with two alternative actions: the retweet or the mark as favourite.

- 2) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro: ¿Estáis de acuerdo con los 200.000 euros de fianza para Bárcenas?
- 3) RT No, debería haber sido más. FAV Sí, está bien. @BárcenasALaCalleM4

This direct opinion survey approximates one of the gamification strategies identified by Arias (2013) in his analysis of electoral coverage in North American newspapers; the

use of questionnaires would be, in his opinion, an indicator of information gauging (others would be manipulation, selection and calculator / counting). They are ludic mechanisms that enhance the illusion of participation.

The metainformative illocutivity corresponds to those cases in which the tweet speaks about the own operation of the program, informing of who are the guests to the gathering, or warning of its beginning and end. The three accounts make use of this type of messages.

Most of the messages, however, are dedicated to two types of action: the informative action, where the subject of the enunciation corresponds to the program itself and to its informative discourse, and the quotation action, where it is more or less literally reproduced what someone says in the programme. The *information-comment tweets* are those in which the “voice” of the programme emerges. In them, the evaluation rarely appears explicit in the body of the message, and it is normal to infer it from the hashtag (if there is one). In the *statements tweets*, it is easier for value statements to appear, whether it is the participants in the programs (journalists, politicians, or others) or the news’s own protagonists (political and institutional representatives, anonymous citizens, experts).

If we look at the different uses that each program makes of these types of messages, we observe different prevalences:




TABLE 6: Distribution of the intentionality of the tweets of each program (percentages regarding the 1,000 tweets of each programme).

As the graph shows, the fundamental use of ARV is the quotation one. These literal tweets reproduce above all (61.6%) fragments of statements of the protagonists of the news, for example a representative of some political party, the lawyer of some cause of corruption. Only exceptionally these declarations belong to protagonists of the international present, like François Hollande or Manuel Valls in the days of the *Charlie Hebdo*; the voice is also occasionally given to anonymous citizens, such as one affected

by the preferential scam, an evicted citizen, a spokesperson for the group of Hepatitis C patients, etc.

Quotation tweets that belong to political representatives allow us to see how the voice of the parties is shown in the different programmes, that is, to which parties the protagonism is given. In ARV the three most cited parties are PP, Podemos and PSOE:




TABLE 7: Tweets that reproduce statements by political representatives in ARV.

The other statements correspond to people who present themselves as authorised voices in the evaluation and comment of the news; among them, ARV distributes 29.5% for journalism professionals from other media, usually from the written press (Eduardo Inda / *El Mundo*, Patricia Lopez / *Público*, Jesús Maraña / *Infolibre*, Francisco Marhuenda / *La Razón*, Angélica Rubio / *El Plural...*), and 8.8% for different experts⁸ who talk about the topics discussed, usually professionals from different fields, such as economists, lawyers, judges, etc. according to the nature of the news (Joaquim Bosch, José Carlos Díez, Javier Aroca, Anna Grau, Jorge Verstrynge).

In the informative tweets the one that we can consider the voice of the program is published. In ARV, these tweets represent 17.9% of the total sample; they are clearly representative statements, almost a headline:

- 4) AIrojoVivo @DebatAIrojoVivo: [DIRECTO] La familia Pujol habría ocultado hasta 17 millones de euros a la hacienda entre 2010 y 2013 <http://ow.ly/FwKNs> #MillonesPujolARV

The DTVE program is different from the other two. Although there are also invited commentators, the program has a structure closer to the interview than to the television talk show. Hence, the tweets are basically quotation ones (70.1%), and that quotation always belongs to the guest / interviewed character.

⁸ There are cases in which the present usual commentators, present on the set of the program, are political parties, Miguel Angel Revilla in LMC and Gaspar Llamazares in ARV as more representative cases.




TABLE 8: Tweets that reproduce statements by political representatives in DTVE.

The interviewees during the analysed period belong, for the most part, to the political sphere; as reflected in the graph, the distribution of political parties in the Twitter account of this diffusion space presents a clear prevalence of the PP (59% of respondents), followed by the PSOE. Of the 48 characters of public life whose statements are cited in the sample of tweets, 37 are representatives of political parties and, of these, 21 belong to the PP.

DTVE is also different in the use of the Twitter account itself. The global corpus of 1,000 tweets covers a total of 51 days of program broadcast, but several of those days the use of the social network is limited to one or two messages that inform about the guests and participants in the programme. This emphasis on metainformative illocutivity suggests that the Twitter account is conceived as secondary to the program itself, while in ARV and LMC they are accorded a parallel importance to (or even substitute for) the televised broadcast.

As far as LMC is concerned, the most notable feature is the weight of the comment / information tweets. Unlike the other two accounts, this one frequently assumes (36.8% of the issued tweets) the enunciative voice, without resorting to the encrusted enunciation that the literal quotation provides; in addition, we also find that even in statements tweets the network journalists appear (Jesus Cintorra, Javier Ruiz). It is, therefore, the programme that most profitably makes its presence in the network, which is also confirmed by other already mentioned details, such as the higher frequency of messages, their reissue and permanence, or the greater number of followers and answers.

Regarding the visibility given to the different parties, LMC shows a relatively balanced presence between Podemos (30%) and the PP (28%). The anomalous appearance of an autonomous party, such as the Regionalist Party of Cantabria (PRC) is explained because its president, Miguel Angel Revilla, is one of the usual partners of the program. Here arises another difference between LMC and ARV, relative to the messages that convey the opinion of the guests and / or experts: while ARV gave the floor to journalism professionals in 29.5% of their quotation tweets, in the case of LMC this

proportion is reduced to 21.9%, and the voices outside the press rise to 14.6%. In addition, LMC grants some of its commentators a much greater diffusion than the others (in particular, the echoic function with regard to Cristina Fallarás and Lucía Caram, whose interventions are remarkably critical and axiological), stands out in particular.




TABLE 9: Tweets that reproduce statements by political representatives in LMC.

As we have described, most of the tweets issued by the programmes admit an expressive, evaluative reading, regarding the news that they broadcast and comment on each programme. This circumstance means a notable difference with regard to the analysis of Twitter accounts belonging to the written media or television news programmes, which is directly related to the information genre of infotainment in which we include these programmes (Pellisser and Pineda, 2014).

3.1.1.2. Illocutivity in corpus R

The reactive corpus is formed by the response tweets of the followers of the programmes. If the analysis of political discourse analyses the power management mechanisms, and this depends to a large extent on access to public space, Twitter is a privileged scenario for the anonymous citizen to access that space. The R messages, belonging to the accounts of the followers of each program, have a reactive interactive orientation, whose basic intentionality we have codified with the following categories:⁹

- *Praise or defense*: the tweet defends / praises another follower, a party, a political representative, a journalist, the television programme. They are frankly scarce.
- *Attack*: the tweet expresses the negative assessment referred to another follower of the programme, to a party, to a political representative, to a journalist or, in other occasions, to the television programme itself or the television network.
- A specific case of these negative assessment tweets are certain tweets that are practically reduced to *exclamations* and expletives, with different degrees of topicalisation and humour, if not of clear sarcasm; they are tweets that point above all to indignation and complaint, which manifests itself in different degrees

⁹ Of course, we refer to a classification of predominates; except in the case of interjections, for every expressive act of attack or praise there is a propositional base that constitutes a representative act.

of concretion, as an attack on the political class in general, a certain party, or a certain politician. We consider that in these cases the expressive force of the indignation clearly predominates over the representative force of the political commentary.

- Information / comment: the tweet expresses his or her opinion regarding the information contained in the trigger tweet, sometimes proposing new subtopics expanding the focus, or expressing his or her agreement or discrepancy.
- In some very exceptional cases, the protagonists mentioned in the tweets of the programmes (relevant person or journalist-participant) interact with the followers using reactive tweets.

The illocutivity analysis in the tweets of the corpus R shows that the most frequent are those of representative intentionality. Among the predominantly expressive tweets, the orientation is basically negative, as reflected in the following table. The data offer a generalised climate of tiredness, mistrust and disappointment with politics, with a minimal presence of the opinions that defend a party, politician or journalist.

ILLOCUTIVITY	ARC	DTVE	LMC	TOTAL
Expressive: attack	117	24	150	291
Expressive: praise	6	8	15	29
Expressive: generalised indignation	14	1	16	31
Representative: information / comment	289	121	287	697
Directive	9	2	10	21
TOTAL	444	156	516	1116

TABLE 10: Distribution of the illocutivity in Corpus R tweets

Attack tweets are, basically, addressed against political parties and their representatives, with an orientation that we will detail when analysing the political alignment of the messages; ARV followers offer more cases in which the attack is directed against participating journalists or against the program itself:

- 5) I_G_G_A @I_G_G_A: @DebatAlRojoVivo Juaaaaaas, Ferreras dice q informa d @ahorapodemos! Distanciándose?
- 6) Isabel Jiménez @isabelinajg: @I_G_G_A @DebatAlRojoVivo @ahorapodemos El Ferrera no trata igual a todos los políticos. Mentira de los ERES de pasada y a pablo muuuuu suave

There are hardly any cases of praise to parties or politicians, and in most cases it is a defense shift after another tweet has expressed explicit attacks:

- 7) Fergalrod @fergalrod61: @Rafaln13 @DebatAlRojoVivo Sinceramente creo que Zapatero iba por buen camino, pero era muy blando con sus acólitos y le tomaron el pelo Sí encontramos algunos mensajes que explicitan admiración y elogio dirigidos a periodistas, por ejemplo Cristina Fallarás, Jesús Cintorra o María Casado (a veces hay seguidores que son verdaderos fans):
- 8) Antonia Raya @RayaRaya58: @mananascuatro @LaFallaras Cristina: como siempre has estado genial..eres única...me gustaría verte todos los días.eres tan autentica

The predominance of representative illocutivity, however, does not exclude the predominantly valued value of the R corpus, a factor that has an obvious anchoring in

the fact that all messages are responses to a previous affirmation. Bruns and Burgess (2013: 802) point out in their analysis that citizens' tweets are, above all, evaluative messages, which express their perspectives on the events discussed with the intention of demonstrating these positions, rather than contributing to the formal debate. Of course, the clearest expression of value is the expressive act of attack (of insult) to the protagonists of current politics, see the reactive tweet to this tweet of LMC:

- 9) Las Mañanas de Cuatro @mananascuatro: Para González Pons, IU “Ahora es @ahorapodemos y @PSOE que es queremos pero no podemos” #BrotosBordesM4
- Juan lopez @asustadizo1: @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos @PSOE TU ERES TONTO GONZALEZ PONS

These explicit attack tweets also mean representative speech acts insofar as they propose an assertion with presumed truth value; however, in many cases the expressive nuance of attack predominates or, to a much lesser extent, praise of the protagonists of the news. Recall that Searle's classical definition states that the expressive act manifests psychological states; Anger and outrage are probably the most present in our corpus, but there are also many examples of direct insults and imprecations. Hence, it is necessary to contemplate, on the one hand, the illocutive predominancies, and on the other, the ideological alignments that emerge from each propositional act; for example, in the following reactive tweet, the most important action is the representative one, to comment on a certain message, but the simultaneous existence of an attack intent on the PSOE is undeniable:

- 10) Jorge Bienvenido @Jorditurismo: @Desayunos_tve @lozanoirene @UPyD @La1_tve @24h_tve todo empezó primero por culpa de Felipe gonzalez pero esq luego ZP la cagó pero bien

In the reactive tweet of the following example, directive illocutivity predominates, but again the negative evaluative dimension is copresent, this time against “la familia pepera”:

- 11) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo: [DIRECTO] @c_floriano: “La actuación de este señor me ha causado indignación y vergüenza” <http://ow.ly/Haeoc> #LuisSéLibreARV
- Jesús María Oteiza @donlucio2006: @DebatAlRojoVivo @c_floriano Vaya usted a tomar el pelo a su familia pepera, cuadrilla de mafiosos insoportables y sin ningún tipo de vergüenza

Along with the tweets whose propositional force clearly identifies an object of attack and criticism, we relatively often find other messages that simply express a global complaint, close to the interjection, and that mean almost an exhibitionist tantrum. We find from common locutions (“¡Que viva el vino!”), to apostrophes of offense or insult (“¡¡Qué hipócritas!! ¡¡Lo indignante es su cinismo!!”, “¡Venga ya! ¡Chorizos!”), or exclamations of lament (“¡y los ciudadanos maltratados!”), “¡La España del disparate no tiene fin!”). Observe as an example the following case, with several comments from followers in that same discursive line:

- 12) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro: Libertad bajo fianza de 200.000 euros para Bárcenas > mdia.st/1DYi7Mn
- luzya @luzyatm88: @mananascuatro: esto sí que es tenerlos cuadraos.... (ironiamodooon)
- margarita ramón @ramn_margarita: @mananascuatro Cimpon!! Oleeeee!!! Made in Spain... y ahora a viviiiiir!!
- CARPERO @carperovip: @mananascuatro que **** vergüenza

As can be seen in these examples, Twitter is also a place to display inventiveness and irony, if not directly sarcasm. Holton and Lewis (2011) have pointed out the importance of humor on Twitter as a mechanism to attract the interest of audiences, similar to the way in which political satire attracts followers for television programs; in their analysis of a corpus of 22,000 tweets published by journalists, they note that the most active in the network are precisely those who most resort to humour, and that this causes a greater response (and follow-up) by users who follow their accounts. Our corpus does not make a great humorous display in the tweets of the television programmes, but in its followers tweets, which fits one of the features pointed out by Del Moral (apud Caldevilla, 2009: 38) for “politics 2.0”: “The medium favours humour: parodies circulate faster than doctrines”. Thus, the statements of Gonzalez Pons saying that Izquierda Unida was “Podemos” and the PSOE “queremos pero no podemos” provoke, for example, comments like these:

- 13) Joseluis @joseluislandari: @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos @joseluislandari: LO peor de todo es que los amigos PPGETITAS de Gonzalez Pons NI QUIEREN, NI PUEDEN NI SABEN
- 14) maricastaña @evalbanta: @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos @PSOE y el pp es ni podemos, ni sabemos ni queremos
- 15) JOSE @join92 @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos @PSOE Q gracioso es este payaso sin cerebro!!! Debería estar en el circo. Bueno en un más grande del que está

Thus, of the total of ,116 tweets in the R corpus, 697 (62.5%) are statements of representative predominance, in which the follower makes an informative or commentary contribution to the triggering tweet. The argumentative and informative density of these messages is certainly scarce and, as we shall see, merely enunciative, we would say that with a willingness to demonstrate, to take advantage of public space to show one's opinion. The usual are evaluative comments, often moralistic, that touch the expressive nuance and that neither await response nor validation. D'heer and Verdegem (2015: 229) point out in their analysis of the account of the Flemish program De Zevende Dag, that the criticism and irony of the messages of the followers seem to be an end in itself, without users wanting real political changes through participation in Twitter: “Triviality, creativity and irony go hand in hand with the presentation of one's expertise, knowledge or opinion on the issues as debated on TV” (2015: 230). The set of our tweets reflects a simplifying vision of political reality, a *totum revolutum* of sharp and unquantifiable positions:

- 16) Josuaj8 @josuaj8: @DebatAlRojoVivo @inesgacaballo nos quitamos a ETA de encima y ahora tenemos un gobierno corrupto y que no da medicamentos y los deja morir

Exceptionally, we also find a type of tweet that stands out for the moralistic and instructive tone, which seems to assume that the message has effects beyond the instantaneous speed of a tweet. This is the case with some especially active users of the DTVE programme:

- 17) Los Desayunos @Desayunos_tve: “Este Gobierno ha abandonado a los jóvenes, ha reducido la política activa de empleo un 35%” M. de la Rocha @PSOE en #DesayunosTVE
- Humberto E.Reynolds @reynoldshumbert: @Desayunos_tve @PSOE Los jóvenes sun los primeros caídos cuando los menos Jovenes se corrompen y pagan los platos rotos. Es injutso esto

- Ladrando a la luna @Mitix009 @Desayunos_tve @PSOE A toda la población, y nadie ha hecho nada. Ahora que vienen elecciones todo el mundo se golpea el pecho

3.1.2. The interpretative framing of the hashtag

The tweets hashtags function as an element of textual coherence that allows a group of tweets to be joined semantically. But in addition, they are also a brand element, which explains why both ARV and LMC almost always finish their hashtags by adding ARV and LM4, and that DTVE adds #DesayunosTVE to almost all of their tweets. D'heer and Verdegem (2015) emphasise that the hashtags point to the creation of a collective entity, as a visible and deliberate attempt by the user to be part of the group.

Regarding the corpus of triggering tweets, while the programme of the public network only uses metainformative hashtags, in the two private channels the use of thematic tags (#) works as a textual consistency footprint, providing framing keys (frame) interpretive for the news. It is evident that ARV uses it much less, but it usually refers to the content of the tweet in which it appears, while LMC makes a more generic use that does not fit both the tweet and the global program; the tweet is built with a referential, informative enunciative structure, but its political interpretation is framed by an explicit hashtag.

Unlike corpus made with thematic criteria and from the search for tags, our corpus offers alternative hashtags for the same informative event, which may reflect nuances of interpretation.

18) ARV	LM4
19) #AguirreSeMojaARV	#EspeAceleraM4
20) #NicolásAnteElJuezARV	#DeclaraNicolásM4
21) #NegociosNicolásARV	#NicolásGateM4
22) #UltrasDetenidosARV	#OperaciónNeptunoM4
23) #LuisSéLibreARV	#BárcenasALaCalleM4

We also see the differences between the same content depending on if it is framed or not by the program's label; see these two tweets of the two programs:

- 24) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro: Roca: "Discrepamos y sólo pedimos que se aplique la ley. La infanta ha recogido la noticia mal, evidentemente" #ALaInfantaLeTocaM4
- 25) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo: [DIRECTO] Roca, abogado de la infanta Cristina: "Discrepamos con la resolución, contradice una doctrina consolidada" <http://ow.ly/Gh4FO>

Or according to the label, it has an axiological or informative orientation:

- 26) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro: Según la policía, Revenga le asesoró sobre cómo hablar con él de "modo seguro" #ConexiónNicolasM4
- 27) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo: García Revenga avisó a Nicolás de que su teléfono estaba pinchado [VÍDEO] #NicolásMienteARV

The valuation hashtags contradict the presumed neutrality of the informative discourse. Frequently, the interpretive nuance is derived from another information appearing on the screen. For example, the hashtag #NosTomanPorTontosM4 is accompanied on the screen by another text box where you read "Spain leaves the crisis?"; the hashtag #MangantesM4 is accompanied by the text "Bankia: sombra aquí, sombra allá". Valuations can also be based on the use of irony; for example, Minister De Guindos'

assertion that Spaniards were no longer afraid of losing their job causes the hashtag #SinMiedoM4:

- 28) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro: La España de Rajoy #DobleVaraM4 <http://t.co/WdR7zGv3Cq>
- 29) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro: Rafa Hernando a @ahorapodemos: "Cuando el asno se viste de León, se le acaban viendo las orejas" #InsultosAPodemosM4

Our corpus R offers a very limited use of labels, which contrasts with other studies whose data selection starts precisely from the labeling.

3.2. The referential dimension of the tweet: categories related to content

Both subcorpora have a dependency relationship, in the sense that all the tweets in corpus R are reactions to the initiatory tweets published by the accounts of the three television programmes. This explains the thematic subordination of corpus R to corpus D.

3.2.1. Theme / topic

The theme of the tweet is often proposed as a hashtag by the programme itself, although sometimes the programme addresses issues different from those reflected in the hashtag; it is frequent that, especially in the case of LMC, headlines on screen are used, giving information on the subject that is addressed, for example *Bárcenas leaves prison*, *Demand for royal paternity*, *Andalusian firefighters in struggle*.

The analysis of the topics dealt with in the corpus tweets is only a descriptive analysis, since the three accounts are spread over different time stages, and in order to compare the treatment that the three programs give to the information reality, the data should cover the same temporary space. However, eliminated the 497 metainformative and directive tweets, and identifying up to 2 topics in each message, we found that the main topics covered in the tweets are:

- The political parties, which appear in 772 tweets, (their leaders, their weight in the general political panorama, their electoral strategy or their internal problems). The indisputable protagonism is without a doubt of Podemos, followed by the PP and, at a considerable distance, the PSOE and the other parties.
- The topic of political corruption with 743 tweets (especially the Bárcenas case, but also the Caja Madrid Black cards, the Pujol case, the “pequeño Nicolás” case, the Nóos-Urdangarín case, the case of training funds, the Castedo case, Díaz Ferrán, Punic and Gürtel plots...).
- Evolution and effects of the economic crisis, in 290 tweets (cuts and austerity measures, social impoverishment, unemployment, young emigration, evictions, possible economic recovery).
- Terrorism, especially for the jihadist attacks in France (attack to the *Charlie Hebdo* magazine), but also on ETA terrorism; 245 tweets.
- Reforms and legal initiatives, especially those of the PP (abortion, transparency, tax reform, party financing, citizen security...) but also proposals from other parties when they reach the government; 155 tweets.

Other issues dealt with at certain intervals are the sanitary crises of the moment (Ebola and hepatitis C), Catalan independentism, violence in soccer (death of an ultra follower of the Depor), gender violence, meteorological information, monarchy, the resignation of Torres-Dulce, or the possible PP-PSOE pact.

For the most part, followers comments refer to the topic of the triggering tweet; we found two divergent behaviors:

- Tweets that propose a new subtopic regarding the subject in question, opening the information spectrum.
- Tweets that claim the specific topicalisation of a certain unrelated subject.

3.2.2. Protagonists of the tweet

The prominence of a tweet from the D corpus, obviously, gives visibility to a certain politician or party in the public sphere of current news, narratively developing the issues that we have just identified; we situate ourselves in the syntactic field of actanciality, which is related to what Wodak (2001: 73) calls “predicative strategy” and is part of the media agenda selection mechanism. This informative role depends, of course, on the specific period to which the tweets belong, in our case, between October 2014 and January 2015.

The protagonism can be *enunciative* and *agentive*. The first one refers, as we saw, to statement tweets; we have already analysed how the three programs give voice to the protagonists of the political sphere. The *agentive* protagonism refers to the scope of the political reality that describes the utterance of the tweet. Given that the DTVE program has an interview format rather than a chat room, it is understood that in its tweets there is more enunciative than agentive protagonism. However, the two talk shows have greater richness in agentive protagonism, which is explained because the reference gender is not the interview, but the news (interviews are brief and occasional); On the other hand, the predominance of declarative tweets also facilitates enunciative protagonism as we have described.

We have analysed a maximum of two protagonists for the utterance of each tweet, strictly considering the text of the message, not the label or the mentions. This way, we find some tweets whose subject of the statement does not coincide with a political protagonist or designates a more or less diffuse collective (“the people”, “hepatitis C patients”, “the power”, “jihadism”, “preferred stockholders”):

- 30) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo: [DIRECTO] Liaño: "En esta vida, todos podemos ser útiles pero nadie es imprescindible" <http://t.co/jEBf6CxSHV> #LuisSéLibreARV
- 31) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo: Apararecen pintadas a favor del yihadismo en Ceuta: "Lo de #CharlieHebdo es poco" [VÍDEO] <http://t.co/x9lhY5m86f>

Other groups, however, have an entity as an actor in the political reality: students, patients with Hepatitis C, terrorists, the Government.

If we look at the two major issues developed in the corpus, corruption, and the actions of political parties and representatives, we can see which are the specific actors that support the informative story in which, often, both issues overlap. Of the 3,000 tweets in corpus D, 606 give actantial relevance to the PP or to people linked to this party, to which we can add 54 tweets whose subject is “the Government”; stand out on the rest the protagonisms of Francisco Nicolás Sánchez (116 tweets),¹⁰ Mariano Rajoy (102 tweets), Luis Bárcenas (95 tweets) and Esperanza Aguirre (41 tweets). The next most involved party in the global discourse is Podemos, with a total of 182 tweets, 37 of which refer to actions in which Pablo Iglesias participates. It is followed by the PSOE, with 88 agentive allusions in the tweets, and CiU with 73, which are distributed fairly evenly between Artur Mas and Jordi Pujol and their family. The judges (Castro, Ruz) and lawyers (Gómez de Liaño, Roca) of the different causes, as well as some members of the Borbón family, also have their narrative protagonism related to these two main themes.

Even so, as we already mentioned on the subject, the asymmetry of the corpus regarding the time extension of the three accounts prevents us from making comparisons regarding the selection of the agenda of the three programs.

3.3. The interactive dimension of the tweet: categories related to alignment and affiliation

By definition, communication requires the concurrence of two or more speakers; even when we speak alone we have a recipient. The interactive dimension of the texts is linked to that plurality of subjects and voices that participate in each communicative event. The concurrence of two or more speakers in a communicative act requires, in pragmatic terms, their acceptance of the principle of cooperation of Grice (1975), that is, the tacit agreement that they agree to participate in a certain verbal exchange that develops with a certain communicative purpose. From the neurocommunicative point of view, the cooperation principle (Gallardo, 2007) can be understood as a direct linguistic manifestation of the theory of the mind, which is biologically sustained, as we said, in mirror neurons.

Such a plurality of voices, which exists in the speech act (enunciation), can leave different traces in the text (enunciation), be they simple traces of functional, structural linkage, or an explicit manifestation of semantic and ideological conformity / disconformity. To account for these possibilities, we have developed an analysis methodology referred to three levels of interactivity in each tweet:

¹⁰ Although we cannot develop this aspect in a work of general analysis, it is evident that both the case of the “pequeño Nicolás”, as the Bárcenas case, gather optimal ingredients for the narrative spectacularisation of politics, one of the features that we attribute to the pseudo-politics of social networks (Gallardo and Enguix, 2016).

1. Interactive orientation
 - a. Mentions @
 - b. Marcas de segunda persona
 - c. Trigger / triggered syntax
2. Intertextuality / dialogism
 - a. Retweets
 - b. Literal quotations
 - c. Links
3. Ideological affiliation
 - a. Conformity / Discrepancy with another tweet
 - b. Affiliation / Partial disaffiliation

3.3.1. Interactive targeting marks

The studies on spectacularisation have highlighted (Pellisser and Pineda, 2014) the capacity (and the need) of television to make the spectator feel co-protagonist and coparticipant of the present, what J. Timoteo (2007) describes as “being part of the system, of ‘the ointment’”. In a certain sense, social networks can be considered as a maximum stage of this participation in the public sphere; the conversational simulation offered by Twitter, Facebook, etc., could be considered in this sense an index of co-participation. Hence, one of the most repeated topics about social networks points, in fact, to its importance in the promotion of sociability; the Twitter platform itself calls “conversation” the chaining of tweets.

However, the research shows that this chain of tweets does not reflect the degree of co-participation or interaction that is sometimes suggested. For example, in an analysis of relations between Dutch journalists and politicians, Verweij (2012) commented on the 30,000 tweets issued in two hours for 7,000 accounts, on the occasion of the Dutch 2010 elections (tweets with the hashtag #rtldebat, converted into trending topic), they were left unanswered:

“However, none of the politicians responded to the tweets. So the impression that tweets are sent from a closely connected network, representing a virtual community, is wrong. Participants are sending their tweets to followers. These followers can respond, resend the message, or send their own. But the question is whether this process of communication represents a debate within a structured community?”
[Verweij, 2012: 681].

For this reason, we first consider whether in the tweets there are formal (linguistic) traces of co-participation in a conversational gear, using the linguistic notions of predictability and alignment. *Predictability* is undoubtedly the most important concept of discourse analysis developed by the Birmingham School (John Sinclair, Malcolm Coulthard, Michael Stubbs), and has a correlation in the notion of *conditioned relevance* of conversational analysis (Anita Pomerantz), or in the *chaining constraints* of the interactional pragmatics of the Lyon and Geneva schools (Eddy Roulet, Antoine Auchlin, Alain Trognon, Jacques Cosnier). All these notions point to the same structural

fact: there are linguistic emissions that drag the interlocutor to the dialogical activity, in such a way that certain turns ("Are you coming already?") Predict the appearance of subsequent turns and, inversely, other turns ("Yes"), are predicted by the appearance of previous shifts.

In the conversational narrative, *alignment* is also considered by Stivers (2008: 34) as a structural feature, which ratifies a certain distribution of roles in a communicative situation:

“When a recipient aligns with a telling, he or she supports the structural asymmetry of the storytelling activity: that a storytelling is in progress and the teller has the floor until story completion. Disaligned actions undermine this asymmetry by competing for the floor or failing to treat a story as either in progress or — at story completion — as over. Thus, alignment is with respect to the activity in progress” [Stivers, 2008: 34].

In the tweet, one of the formal features that allows coding this function is mentions (@) of other accounts, which show a response to previous tweets with a function similar to vocative (Mancera and Pano, 2013: 184; Pano and Mancera, 2014: 238). In this sense, Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) point out that the “at” sign functions as an “addressivity marker”. Indeed, the mention of the accounts of others in the tweet itself works as the link movements that link talk turns. All the R tweets are reactive, at least, to the tweet of the programme they comment (@DebatAlRojoVivo, @Desayunos_tve, @mananascuatro), but they also often respond cumulatively to the tweets of other followers, and assimilable structures are produced to the conversational exchange in which a user keeps some talk with another.

Given the restriction of the 140 characters, the inclusion of mentions in the tweet may be limited because it consumes information space; this is confirmed by studies based on interviews with twitterers (D’heer and Verdegem, 2015). In our data, the media publish messages that mostly oscillate between none and 2 mentions, being the most frequent (42.8%) messages with a mention, usually referred to one of the protagonists of the tweet. In this aspect the DTVE account stands out because it makes quite a different use of the mention, using it much more than the other two accounts: 35% of their tweets have more than 3 mentions, compared to 3.2% of ARV and 5,8% of CML; sometimes they consume the 140 characters.

The inclusion of nicknames (@alias) is automatically provided by the platform in response tweets, as an interactivity indicator. In natural languages, interactivity is morphologically manifested through the second grammatical person, or visually through the gaze and some illustrative gestures. That is why the appearance of this feature was registered in the analysis of the tweets. Regarding the corpus of the followers, all the tweets include some mention, because they are all reactive; since the answering function is an automated on-screen option, it is normal for the R tweets to cumulatively include the mentions of the previous users in a thread; When a tweet responds specifically to

another user, we can find cases of non-automatic selection of the nicknames. Moreover, throughout the corpus R there are only two cases in which one of the participants in the program responds to a follower (in particular, Javier Arocas and the character Francisco Nicolás Gómez Iglesias).

In the corpus D, the second person is the recipient of the program, the follower of the account, that is, the citizen-spectator. The tweets only refer directly to this second person in 6.7% of cases, and are almost always meta-informative tweets, related to the duration of the programme, or recommendations to follow the information in the thread. The triggering tweets of the programmes are tweets that do not impose linkage restrictions on the followers, so they do not function as the beginnings of an adjacent conversational pair [I, R], but as Reports, that is, initial turns, but not predictive to later speech.¹¹ Not in vain the surface of the social networks in which it is written are usually called “walls”, and in this sense the tweets are related to the graffiti on the walls, those messages left in public spaces without a fixed destination.

These uses of the second person are given in meta-informative and directive tweets. For example, ARV publishes 13 thank you tweets at the end of the programme, and 22 advertising the programme:

- 32) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo Arranca @DebatAlRojoVivo. Siguelo en #directo <http://ow.ly/FwL5u>
- 33) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo [DIRECTO] Acabamos ya, gracias por estar ahí. Sigue la información en @sextanoticias con @helenaresano <http://ow.ly/Haeoc> #La6N14H

The programme of the public channel shows greater use of the second person, but for issues unrelated to the program (tweets that request the sending of a photograph); in addition, there are several initial tweets that greet the recipients giving the weather forecast. LMC appeals to the recipients also in the appreciation and recommendation to follow the program, but also introduces some mobilisation tweets in some solidarity campaigns:

- 34) LasMañanasCuatro @mananascuatro Para colaborar #TodosContraLaPobrezaInfantilM4 Llama al 900 10 36 46 o entra en <http://todoscontralapobrezainfantil.org>

In the R corpus we occasionally find reactive tweets that are explicitly addressed to one of the participants in the program, directly interjecting them, but without predictability:

- 35) Los Desayunos @Desayunos_tve En la tertulia, hoy @CarmendelRiego @LaVanguardia, Mayte Alcaraz @ABC_es y @arsenioescolar @20m #DesayunosTVE @La1_tve @24h_tve
- Humberto E. Reynolds @reynoldshumbert @Desayunos_tve @europapress_es @chanihenares @jcherrero @La1_tve @24h_tve @MariaCasado_TVE Antes muerto que perder la vida jajajaja Chani
- Humberto E. Reynolds @reynoldshumbert @Desayunos_tve @CarmendelRiego @LaVanguardia @abc_es @arsenioescolar @20m @La1_tve @24h_tve Arseni Separación de Poderes es VITAL

¹¹ Clinical linguistics studies show that conversational progression through exchanges [Report, Evaluative Reaction], instead of [Start, Answer], is typical of population groups for which a deficit of theory of mind is identified, such as the Williams Syndrome (Gallardo, 2007).

- 36) matilde sanchez @matisan54 @DebatAlRojoVivo Pilar qué centrada, cuando hablas de los ERES no lo eres, estamos de campaña y el PP gobierna, de que vas? (Pilar: periodista Pilar López, de ABC, presente en el programa).

Relatively often, followers who comment on a certain tweet do so by responding to a previous follower, and some brief exchanges are established, usually of discrepancy and attack. The users of the three programmes show a similar profile in the use of this feature, which, however, as other works show, does not make the dialogue capacity of the platform excessively profitable: it appears in 27% of the ARV tweets, 27,7% of the DTVE tweets and 25.9% of the LMC tweets. It is worth mentioning in this section a phenomenon that, although it is present in the followers of the three accounts, it is radicalised in DTVE: we refer to the existence of users of very high level of activity, true fans of the programme, who concentrate a large part of the reactive tweets. The sample of 156 R tweets of the programme of the public channel shows that 42 messages (27%) are published by the same follower, and 20 (12.8%) by another one.

Finally, there are syntactic traces that also point to a conversational communicative framework, and that allow an analysis in conversational structural terms (Pano and Mancera, 2014). On very few occasions our corpus shows cases of direct questions, which can be considered as true cases of predictability; as we have already seen, the mechanisms that articulate directive acts do not generally rely on syntax. However, it is frequent that the tweets of the followers of the program are answered by other followers, generating adjacent pairs of initiation and response that conform to the model [Judgment / Conformity-Discrepancy] in all its adjustable spectrum.

- 37) Al Rojo Vivo @AlRojoVivo [DIRECTO] @c_floriano: "La actuación de este señor me ha causado indignación y vergüenza" <http://ow.ly/Haeoc> #LuisSéLibreARV
- pepita rubiales @pepita_rubiales 20 ene. @DebatAlRojoVivo @c_floriano bochornoso, la periodista Pilar... Para defender a ultranza al pp saca a colación a la presidenta andaluza
 - Juan Casamayor @modescasamayor 20 ene. @pepita_rubiales @DebatAlRojoVivo @c_floriano es su trabajo esta señora es LAMECULOS OFICIAL DEL @PPopular
 - carantoña @porartedemajia 20 ene. @modescasamayor @pepita_rubiales @DebatAlRojoVivo @c_floriano @PPopular espero que no lo dijeras por susana igual es mi error al leerlo
 - Juan Casamayor @modescasamayor 20 ene. @porartedemajia @pepita_rubiales @DebatAlRojoVivo @c_floriano @PPopular lo digo por la seudoperiodista de la razon PILAR
 - carantoña @porartedemajia 20 ene. @modescasamayor @pepita_rubiales @DebatAlRojoVivo @c_floriano @PPopular si lo entendí

3.3.2. Marks of intertextuality and dialogism

One of the formal marks of intersubjective capacity is the inclusion in the text of other voices. In the corpus of tweets, this phenomenon manifests itself in three different categories: the retweet, the literal quote and the hyperlink.

Retweets are little used in the corpus, something that undoubtedly influences the methodology of sample selection. In corpus D, the program that most retweets is LMC (169 tweets out of 1,000), followed by DTVE (105); it is striking that ARV only shows two examples of retweet in the whole sample. As for the data of corpus R,

we find only two cases in which the followers retweet a foreign message in response to the programme's tweet.

Many tweets in the D corpus consist of the reproduction of literal quotes assigned to the protagonists of the current news. This category, which aligns D tweets with declarations journalism, combines the referential dimension with the strategy of intertextual framing, through which political discourse allows the introduction of the voice of the different political actors (Gallardo, 2014). As we have described when talking about the intentionality of the messages, the embedded quote allows the representative acts of the protagonists (politicians, journalists or citizens) to be converted into a representative act, either with the explicit mention of the *verbum dicendi* or with the direct quote (although often, "versioned"):

- 38) LasMañanasCuatro @mananascuatro.@Rafa_Hernando a @ahorapodemos: "Se presentan como Don Limpio pero en cuanto les pasas el algodón está lleno de suciedad, por no decir caca"
- 39) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo [DIRECTO] Rafael Hernando ataca a @ahorapodemos: "Se presentan como 'Don Limpio' cuando están llenos de 'caca'" <http://ow.ly/Gh89M>

The quotation is used almost exclusively by the initiatory tweets of the accounts of the three programmes; our analysis differentiates between two types of appointment:

- that referred to one of the protagonists of the news, politician, witness, citizen affected by the subject in question;
- that of one of the guests as commentators, in which case the voices of journalism professionals predominate, along with those of other television personalities (Lucía Caram and Cristina Fallarás, for example, in LMC, Javier Arocas, Ernesto Ekáizer in ARV).

The quote, however, may be non-verbal in nature, given the multimodality of the network. Many times, tweets introduce audiovisual elements (links to videos and websites, especially in the programmes messages) or iconic ones (links to photos in tweets of followers). As we have seen, studies on the use of Twitter have given importance to the presence of links in the tweet, considering them an index of interactivity. It is common for the ARV and LMC tweets to include a link to the network's own website; but while ARV tends to link videos (those issued in the programme's own development) that are no longer operative after the broadcast, LMC usually links to a web space that adds video and text, and it is common for that text to later suffer modifications and give rise to a kind of "expanded tweet", published after the program. In the corpus of followers we find little presence of this resource, which tends to link with videos and photographs.

3.3.3. Ideological affiliation marks: the partisan opinion

In this section we consider the analysis of the ideological dimension of the published tweets. Obviously, the results are directly conditioned by the specific political stage in which the corpus is generated, so that the final result can not be extrapolated, but only the analysis model.

As is well known, ideological analysis is one of the main lines of research of the school of critical discourse analysis. For example, in his methodological proposal of analysis of press texts, Jäger (2001: 54-55) proposes as one of the phases the ideological analysis based on the contents, although she does not explicitly indicate the effective technique to verify said ideology. Wodak (2001, 2007) also emphasises the importance of ideology in the perspectives of critical discourse analysis, or critical linguistics. In her historical presentation of this current, this author defends the compatibility between the objectification of the data and taking sides in the analysis:

“Basically, “critical” is to be understood as having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research” [Wodak, 2001: 9].

On the other hand, Van Dijk (1998) devotes several investigations to study power relations, pointing out the ideological scope of the different textual / discursive uses. Our analysis partially departs from these approaches, since it does not seem compatible to objectify the data and make explicit our own political position. As other authors have pointed out, for example Charaudeau (2009) or Maingueneau (2012), discourse analysis is, by definition, a critical analysis, and criticism should not be confused with the militancy of the analyst; conversely, there is no discursive analysis that does not include a critical approach:

“L’AD [Anàlisi del discurs] es troba, per la seva pròpia naturalesa, oberta a un procediment crític, ni que sigui perquè pressuposa l’existència d’un “ordre de discurs”: en certa manera, posa en suspens qualsevol intent de neutralització de la relació entre el discurs i el món, les paraules i les coses, per reprendre l’expressió de Foucault” [Maingueneau, 2012: 79].

In this aspect the statements of Barthes (1966) in his well-known defense of the nouvelle critique as an approach to the theory of literature are also valid:

“La verdadera ‘crítica’ de las instituciones y de los lenguajes no consiste en ‘juzgarlos’, sino en distinguirlos, en separarlos, en desdoblarlos. Para ser subversiva, la crítica no necesita juzgar: le basta hablar del lenguaje, en vez de servirse de él” [Barthes, 1966: 14].

With this theoretical approach, we analyse each tweet looking for traces of alignment or agreement with other people’s texts, both structurally / conversationally, and at the discursive / ideological level. To differentiate these two levels we use the concepts of alignment and affiliation, as they differ in conversational analysis. While alignment is a structural concept, which implies the acceptance of a certain distribution of participatory roles (and which we have analysed as an interactive orientation mark in §3.3.1), the concept of affiliation allows us to account for the ideological affinity between an emission and certain previous emission:

“In contrast to alignment, with the term affiliation I mean that the hearer displays support of and endorses the teller’s conveyed stance” [Stivers, 2008: 35].

If Twitter allows the voting citizen to access the public sphere and express his or her political opinion, it is expected that such opinion means the manifestation of partisan options. Mazzoleni (2014) has pointed out, among others, how the selective exposure to messages of related ideology is accentuated in social networks. In the same way that the citizen tends to be informed by the media that most coincides with their ideological spectrum (which promotes what is known as “journalism of validation”, Eco, 2006; Timoteo, 2007; Castells, 2009), the Twitter user follows above all the accounts of the media, parties and politicians that fit their information preferences. This explains a certain resurgence of the theories of “limited effects” or “minimal effects” (Bennet and Iyengar, 2008), which Mazzoleni reformulates as *diffuse effects*.

In studies on Twitter based on Big Data, the term that is commonly used to account for this affiliation is that of *homophily* (Kwak et al., 2010), that is, the tendency of individuals to associate with their peers. In one of these works, Yardy and Boyd (2010) verify the sociological principle of homophily from a corpus of 30,000 tweets referring to the shooting and murder of an abortionist doctor from Kansas, George Tiller, and the ensuing debate on abortion. The choice of the corpus is made by searching for words like *#tiller*, *pro-life*, *pro-choice*, *abortion*, or *George Tiller*. From the initial sample of 30,000 tweets in a week, they analysed a subgroup of 6,698 published 24 hours immediately after the murder. They classified these tweets analysing their content as pro or against abortion, and took into account the number of replicas produced among the users of each group; they find 73 exchanges between people who share the same pro or anti-abortion position (conformities), compared to 396 interactions between users of opposing positions (discrepancies). Their study leads them to conclude that response tweets to people of similar ideology reinforce group identity, while interaction with dissimilar people reinforces the boundaries “inside” and “outside” the groups. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that, effectively, the communicative activity through twitter can have an effect on the sociability of the users.

In the sphere of political ideology, a much-quoted study by Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner and Welpé (2010), referring to the 2009 German elections and based on 100,000 tweets with allusions to politicians and / or parties, led them to conclude that the simple number of mentions of the parties was a reliable indicator of the electoral result:

“An analysis of the tweets’ political sentiment demonstrates close correspondence to the parties’ and politicians’ political positions indicating that the content of Twitter messages plausibly reflects the offline political landscape” [Tumasjan et al., 2011: 178].

The consideration of the possible predictive value of Twitter in electoral contexts, an undoubtedly attractive possibility, opened the door to a cascade of similar investigations

in the immediate years. Conover et al. (2011) analyse how Internet users manifest their political options (political alignment in their terminology) in a corpus obtained from an initial sample of 335 million tweets, generated between September 14 and November 1, 2010 (campaign of the legislative elections to the Congress of the USA). To identify the subgroup of tweets of a political nature, they take as their starting point the hashtags #p2 (“Progressives 2.0”) and #tcot (“Top Conservatives on Twitter”), and then select other cooccurrent labels (#democrats, #vote2010, #obama, #teaparty, #whyimvotingdemocrat), establishing a final inventory of 55 relevant political hashtags for the corpus. This reduces the sample to 252,000 tweets, from which they randomly select 956 accounts that match certain traits of mentions and retweets. With this final corpus they perform the following analysis:

- With a procedure of individual analysis, not computerised, they classify the content of the tweets as “left”, “right” or “ambiguity”, assuming as left tweets those favourable to democrats and progressives, and as right-wing tweets aligned with Republicans, conservatives, liberals and the Tea Party.
- After a screening process, they conclude that there are 373 user accounts with a left affiliation, 506 with right affiliation and 77 ambiguous ones.
- They conclude that retweets show a high degree of partisan alignment, while mentions between users do not reflect this segregation by parties. That is, the average user retweets the parties with which he has an affinity, but interacts politically with like-minded tweeters and, above all, the opposition. The ideological homogeneity of the network of retweets can be explained because it is more usual to follow accounts of close parties than of the opposite ones.

In short, the bibliography already offers multiple cases of analysis on the use of Twitter to manifest ideological identification with other messages. All agree, however, on the need to move from automated analysis to individual analysis that requires careful reading of each tweet. To deepen this same analysis in our corpus, in this section we consider the discursive resources that allow the author of a tweet to show partisan affiliation. For this, obviously, we stick only to those messages whose subject matter affects Spanish politics.

3.3.3.1. The partisan affinity in corpus D: political parallelism

Political parallelism was proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) to refer to the more or less stable relationship between a journalistic medium and the defense of the positions of a certain political party; it is, as is easy to see, a concept similar to affiliation. This can be more or less passionate, that is, have an explicit anchoring in the text or depend on inferences. That is why it is interesting to cross this feature with the illocutivity of the tweets.

Thus, the corpus D statements of representative illocutivity may also contain manifestations of affiliation, sometimes indirectly (for example, when the members of a certain party are reported to have committed a crime) or explicitly, especially through hashtags:

- 40) Las Mañanas Cuatro@mananascuatro La intervención del Estado constata que el PP pagó en negro su sede #CaradurasM4
- 41) Las Mañanas Cuatro_@mananascuatro Rajoy dice que nadie se quedara sin el medicamento prescrito por los médicos #ChanchullerosM4
- 42) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo [DIRECTO] La Agencia Tributaria descubre nuevas cuentas y sociedades de Oleguer Pujol Ferrusola <http://ow.ly/Hae6E> #ClanPujolARV

We classified the tweets according to neutrality or explicit affiliation pro or against a certain political party or character, and considering both the cases in which it is made through explicit statements or through the use of inference. We consider that tweets that do not refer explicitly to parties or political representatives are neutral from the point of view of affiliation; for example, although it is obvious that a representative of Podemos like Carolina Bescansa has a very defined political affiliation, her statements in the following tweet are neutral, since the criticism does not explicitly point to a political protagonist who is unequivocally identifiable with a party.

- 43) AlRojoVivo @DebatAlRojoVivo [DIRECTO] @CBescansa: "Los aparatos institucionales son los que permiten que esto pueda pasar" <http://ow.ly/FwL3A> #CastedoSeVaARV

We are interested in seeing how political subjectivity is built on the Internet by resorting to discursive procedures, and in this case the affiliation does not appear, unlike the following example, where a representative of the PSOE, Trinidad Jiménez, does make explicit statements of negative affiliation regarding the PP:

- 44) Los Desayunos @Desayunos_tve "No queremos trabajar con un partido que tiene indicios claros de financiación ilegal". Trinidad Jiménez @gpscongreso #DesayunosTVE

In the information / comment tweets, the affiliation can be linked to the hashtag, not the text itself:

- 45) Las Mañanas Cuatro@mananascuatro Sonia @scastedoramos, recibida en los juzgados entre vítores y pétalos de rosa: "Eres la mejor del mundo" #CarruselCorrupcionM4

This type of analysis allows us to investigate how the manifestations of affiliation are distributed in the three programmes, that is, if there is a clearly identifiable political profile, also indicating whether the expression of affiliation is positive or negative; These are the most remarkable results:

- The PP is the most judged party, with a total of 297 negative affiliation tweets and 66 positive ones; LMC (164 negative tweets) and ARV (113 negative) especially pile it on.
- Podemos receives 67 negative tweets (in all cases, tweets of statements from members of other parties: 27 in ARV, 17 in DTVE and 23 in LMC), and 32 positive tweets (statements from their own representatives, but also information / comment tweets on the fact that the program itself is positioned, especially through hashtags (only 2 positives in DTVE).
- All expressions of clear appreciation of the party or representatives of CiU, basically around the independence movement and the "Pujol case", are negative (24 tweets in ARV, 19 in DTVE and 10 in LMC).

- 26 negative tweets (14 of them in DTVE) and 12 positive ones (7 of them in DTVE) express negative affiliation regarding the PSOE; that is, the PSOE barely receives attention from the two programmes of the private networks.

Obviously, this part of the analysis is directly conditioned by the specific context in which the corpus is obtained, and the criticisms are directly linked to the corruption scandals of the moment. This feature links directly with the spectacularisation and dramatisation of political information (Pellisser and Pineda, 2014), which are in turn features of the narrativisation that characterises public discourse.

3.3.3.2. *The partisan affinity in the corpus R*

As we have seen when reviewing illocutivity, among the comments of the followers, the messages that comment on the information with a basic representative intention (opinions and information) predominate, above the tweets of expressive intentionality, that is, of defense and praise, and of attack and denunciation (to politicians, to journalists, often to the program itself). These tweets easily reveal the issuer's political position, which can be tracked through two membership categories:

- The explicit ideological identification shown by response tweets: we analyse if the tweet in question means an explicit expression of conformity or discrepancy with respect to the opinion shown in the trigger tweet.
- Indirect affiliation: we consider if the tweet, whether it has predominantly expressive or representative intent, manifests a specific political affiliation (opinion), which is based on a wider knowledge than that derived from the tweet in question; this category can also be seen in the trigger tweets, as we will see.

With this double analysis we do not limit the affiliation to the previous tweets, but to the general political discourse (speeches and actions) that is assumed for the party or character in question. On the contrary, we do not interpret judgments regarding other social actors as political affiliations (for example, those referring to judicial decisions, financial institutions or monarchy). This classification goes beyond the intentional analysis of each tweet, as there may be informative tweets (of representative illocutivity) whose inferences suppose in turn an ideological affiliation directly addressed to politicians and parties.

The first level of the analysis is strictly semantic, and refers to the conformity / discrepancy with respect to the judgment that the trigger tweet means.

- 46) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro.@Albert_Rivera: "Los ciudadanos no son tontos. La salida de Bárcenas todo el mundo la sabe leer" #BarcenasaLaCalleM4
- AnaParra AnaParraDomenec 20 ene. @mananascuatro @Albert_Rivera Muy bueno Albert, el mejor razonamiento q he oído en mucho tiempo EL PP SOLO PIENSA CÓMO SE SALVA D LA CÁRCEL

Given the interactional importance of conformity and discrepancy in the political arena, we have codified this feature as a specific category of reactive tweets issued by the followers of each program. Structurally, a format similar to the adjacent pair [judgment / conformity-disagreement] is produced, so that followers tweets are comparable to the second parts of an exchange. As we have seen, programmes tweets fit in the

representative illocuity, which can inform about certain facts or about certain declarations of the protagonists of the present, while answer tweets allow a predominantly expressive / evaluative illocuity.

- 47) Las Mañanas Cuatro_@mananascuatro La revista de Alfonso Guerra ve en @ahorapodemos un riesgo para la democracia #AterrizaMarianoM4
- juan lopez @asustadizo1 30 dic. @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos alfonso guerra un peligro para la democracia fuisteis vosotros con la creacion del GAL
- 48) Los Desayunos_@Desayunos_tve "Ya no hay que explicar que el PP y el PSOE han creado un sistema corrupto, ya se sabe". @lozanoirene @UPyD #DesayunosTVE @La1_tve @24h_tve
- Jorge Bienvenido @Jorditurismo 20 ene. @Desayunos_tve @lozanoirene @UPyD @La1_tve @24h_tve todo empezo primero por culpa de felipe gonzalez pero esq luego ZP la cagó pero bien.

Thus, conformity and disagreement may refer to the assertions of a certain political figure (whether a certain party or a representative), of one of the guests, or of the program itself understood as the issuing subject; at times, they can also point to previous comments from other followers and open brief spaces for interaction (usually disagreeing). This ideological alignment, with statements pro or against what is stated in a previous tweet, can be expressed explicitly, as argumentation, or indirectly, in which case the most common is insult and disqualification more or less fallacious, as can be seen in the previous examples.

The classification is especially relevant when the triggering tweet gathers evaluative statements from today's protagonists. As is known, politics is characterised by an evaluative, axiological language. In the following case we see a trigger tweet that reproduces the statements of a representative of Podemos, Carolina Bescansa:

- 49) Las Mañanas Cuatro @mananascuatro.@ahorapodemos cree que la sala "tendrá que explicar la salida de Bárcenas" <http://mdia.st/1CeJUGi>

Among the 23 tweets to respond to this, a tweet to attack the Podemos party, which in turn triggers other tweets of clear disagreement, developing this type of dialogue:

- Mercedes Garcia @mercedinas27 20 ene. @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos y para cuando el coletas, monedero, tania etc etc. van a dar explicaciones de todos sus chanchullos???
- Arnau Castillo Mur @GranadeN_97 20 ene. @mercedinas27 @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos Te corrijo, supuestos chanchullos, y segundo, han dado explicaciones, que no las leas es otracosa
- Mercedes Garcia @mercedinas27 20 ene. @GranadeN_97 @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos pero como tania es la del coletas, a esa ni se le toca!! Que doble vara de medir la vuestra!!
- Arnau Castillo Mur @GranadeN_97 20 ene. @mercedinas27 @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos Pero no digo que no se le toque, que dices!! Digo que no incluyas a esa mujer en Podemos
- Alvaro Buendia @BuendiaAyala 20 ene. @GranadeN_97 @mercedinas27 @mananascuatro @ahorapodemos si si explicaciones las que quieras pero no se las cree nadie, solo los palmeros

The second level of analysis is already the ideological level, that is, partisan affiliation, as we saw on the subject of the corpus D. In his proposal for analyzing the discourse of press texts, Jäger (2001: 49) calls "discursive position" to the ideological position of a certain medium or person. We have generalized a partisan affiliation (either in defense or in attack), but we are aware that generalization sometimes fails. For example, when we talk about cases of corruption, we have accepted that the attacks on Luis Bárcenas or

Jordi Pujol are amplified and represent an attack, "by extension", on the PP and the CiU. It is about seeing if the tweet in question can have a certain affiliative effect, of identification (usually emotional, rarely rational), in the final recipient. The political identifications of the followers partially reflect those already seen in the respective programs:

- El PP es el partido más juzgado, con 181 tuits críticos en LMC, 160 en ARV y 25 en DTVE; los tuits positivos suman un total de 11 mensajes en total.
- Podemos recibe 39 tuits de crítica (de ellos, solo 2 en DTVE) y 15 tuits positivos (8 en ARV y 7 LMC).
- El PSOE, pese al trato más neutro de los mensajes desencadenantes, obtiene sin embargo 62 tuits negativos (33 en LMC, 17 en ARV y 12 en DTVE).

In any case, the argumentative level (and the grammatical level) of the tweets is clearly minimal, which corresponds to the superficiality of the networks, conditioned by the "short temporality" (Sáez Vacas 2008; Dubuquoi and Prat 2013). Participation is, above all, dissemination-dissemination of messages (retweets), and comments rarely reflect dialogue among several followers. In this regard, along with the aforementioned tweets of "indignant tantrum", another kind of tweet that we have classified as "instructive" stands out, which tries to transmit messages of pompous rhetoric, almost always of negative evaluation towards the subject in question. In the absence of specifying the analysis of the categories that we have indicated in the two corpus, the general impression is that this participation is more exhibitionistic / monological than dialogical / interactive. The fact of writing on the digital walls of networks is not communicatively very far from the writing of graffiti on the walls of the analog world; what changes, of course, is the reach, the echo and the virality that the digital world supposes.

4. Conclusions

We have proposed a model of discursive analysis for Twitter messages, whose categories can be justified from a neuro-communicative theoretical model that, instead of looking for biological correlates for political attitudes, focuses on the discursive uses linked to the theory of mind and ability. intersubjective, taking this cognitive construct as a correlate of mirror neurons. The application of such a model to the tweets broadcast by television infotainment programs and to the tweets of their followers, allows us to describe the different communication modalities deployed in the social network to build political identities.

The analysis of the categories related to the intentionality of the tweets indicates the predominance of representative messages in the programs (with a prominent use of the tues of appointment), while in the users / followers the same representative predominance is tinged with an expressive intentionality of clearly negative predominance. The declarations tweets allow to identify different profiles in the three programs, so that while ARV gives voice to PP (36.9%) and Podemos (24%), and

DTVE to PP (59%) and PSOE (24%), LMC puts Podemos in first place (30%) followed by PP (28%).

Secondly, the analysis of the categories referred to the content allows us to identify, on the one hand, the basic themes of a set of tweets (determined by the moment of the corpus), which are mainly political parties (25.7% of t) D) and cases of corruption (24.8%). On the other hand, in the subgroup of tweets of political issues, we can analyze the agentive protagonism of the tweets (that is, not "who says" but "who does"); but since the three subcorpus of the programs do not correspond to the same time interval, we have analyzed this feature without differentiating the three accounts; the actantial predominance is, above all, of the PP and its representatives (20.2% of the 3000 D-tweets), followed by Podemos and its representatives (6.1%).

Finally, the third level of analysis allows us to draw conclusions about the really interactive aspects in the construction of discursive political identity; We analyze here three types of categories: predictability or alignment (mentions, morphological marks of 2nd person and predictive syntax), intertextuality (retweets, literal quotations and hyperlinks) and ideological affiliation (conformity / discrepancy, and partisan affiliation). We verified, on the one hand, the scarce and irrelevant use of the marks of real dialogical interaction in the tweets, and on the other hand, the use of affiliation marks by each program to establish a certain negative political parallelism; highlights, for example, the importance given to the PP, Podemos and CiU, compared to the almost irrelevance granted in this aspect to the PSOE; On the other hand, the explicit recourse of the accounts of LMC and ARV to show a negative affiliation to the PP is remarkable, while DTVE stands out as the only program where the tweets of positive affiliation with respect to the PP are higher than the negative ones; the accounts of the followers coherently reflect the affiliation manifested by the t-Ds, highlighting as a feature the expression of a negative affiliation to the PSOE that in the tweets of the programs does not appear.

We see, in short, that the proposed model allows to establish political profiles in each user account, and contribute to the reflection on politics and participation in the network, proposing discursive indicators of political parallelism.

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